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Abstract—Plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) can significantly
increase the elasticity of residential electricity demand. This elas-
ticity can be employed to shape the daily aggregated electricity
demand profile of a system comprised of a large number of
residential PEVs’ users sharing one electricity retailer or an
aggregator. In this paper, we propose a joint demand shaping and
altering algorithm for managing vehicle-to-grid (V2G) enabled
PEVs’ electricity assignments (charging and discharging) in
order to diminish the overall electricity procurement costs for
a retailer bidding to two-settlement electricity markets, i.e., a
day-ahead (DA) and a real-time (RT) market. This approach is
decentralized, scalable, fast converging and does not violate users’
privacy. Our simulations’ results demonstrate significant overall
cost savings (up to 28%) for a retailer bidding to an operational
electricity market by using our proposed algorithm. This becomes
even more salient when the power system is integrating a large
number of intermittent energy resources wherein RT demand
altering is crucial due to more likely contingencies and hence
more RT price fluctuations and even more so-called black swan
events. Lower electricity procurement cost for a retailer finally
makes it able to offer better deals to customers and expand its
market capacity. This implies that customers can enjoy lower
electricity bills as well.
Index Terms—Black swan event, demand altering, demand
shaping, electricity markets, flexible load, Plug-in electric vehi-
cles, residential load, retailer, smart grids, vehicle-to-grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ambitious targets and attractive incentives for introducing
PEVs into the transport sector have been aimed in many coun-
tries [1]. In fact, the roadmap is that industry and governments
attain a combined PEV/PHEV sales share of at least 50% for
light duty vehicle (LDV) sales globally by 2050 [2], see Fig.
1.
A generic wholesale electricity market is comprised of
electricity markets such as spot and forward markets for
trading electricity, and ancillary service markets for guaran-
teeing security in the provision. In a deregulated electricity
system, electricity retailers submit demand bids to wholesale
electricity markets. For a day-ahead (DA) electricity market,
these demand bids normally have both electricity demand’s
amount and price components meaning that the retailer buys
the specified electricity only if the market clearing price
(MCP) is not more than its desired price [3]. This bidding can
be carried out in a few predefined rounds allowing the retailers
to update their bids at each round. This type of bidding is
 
Fig. 1: Estimate of Passenger LDV Sales (million) by 2050 [2].
referred to as limit order bidding. Therefore, in this case, the
retailer is willing to shape its aggregated demand profile and
match it to the electricity profile of a successful bid so that it
can minimize its demand from the RT market to balance the
load and accordingly reduce the overall electricity procurement
cost for each following day.
Based on Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland (PJM) Intercon-
nection 2014’s data [4], the average price of electricity per
MWh which has been sold over that year is very close for both
DA and RT markets, i.e., $48.9539 and $48.2063, respectively.
Additionallt, mean reversion theory suggests that prices and
returns finally proceed back towards the mean or the average.
This mean or average can be the historical average of the price
or return or another admissible average [5]. However, hourly
pricing data for these DA and RT markets can be significantly
distinct and unpredictable at some days and/or hours. Hence,
the high uncertainty, particularly in the RT market, can re-
markably impact the overall electricity procurement cost for
a retailer. This becomes even more salient when the power
system is relying on a large number of intermittent energy
resources, e.g., wind farms and solar panels and thus more
RT price fluctuations and even so-called black swan events
[6] may be occurred.
In [7], we provide a statistical modelling and a closed-form
expression for PEVs’ uncoordinated charging demand. Fur-
thermore, in [8] we propose a decentralized demand shaping
algorithm for a priori know desired demand profile for the
next day. An overview of DR and their different classifications
in a deregulated electricity market is discussed in [9]. The
authors in [10] compare different bidding rules in wholesale
electricity market and in particular when there exist PEVs and
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renewables’ penetration in the power grid. In [3], the author
discusses how a time-shiftable load, that may comprise of
several smaller time-shiftable subloads, can optimally submit
its demand bids to DA and RT markets to minimize its
electricity procurement cost. Although this paper provides
closed-form solutions for bidding, it does not offer an approach
for bids submitted to electricity markets for distributed systems
whereby the retailer does not have necessary information about
its customers’ preferences due to privacy concerns.
In [11], charging and discharging of PEVs are managed in
order to maximize the social and individual welfare functions.
However, when it comes to residential users, it is not very
straightforward to seek pertinent utility and welfare functions
for the individual users. Paper [12] describes the basic char-
acteristics of the PJM DA and RT electricity markets. The
author discusses that economic incentives make the DA and RT
market prices converge in the bidding processes. In addition,
The locational marginal pricing (LMP) based markets support
reliable grid operations through efficient pricing signals to the
retailers. Nevertheless, we should note that sending pricing
signals and enabling low electricity consumer’s bidding in the
markets may cause stability problems for the power system,
time of use pricing (ToUP) and RT pricing (RTP) methods
may lead to high simultaneity in customers’ behaviours and
instability in the power grid by generating unfavourable ag-
gregated load profiles [13]. In [14], a RT pricing mechanism
is proposed for the grid operator to manage the DR of retailers
or aggregators upon a contingency of supply.
In [15], the authors investigate the bidding process for
DA and RT markets for data centres by taking into account
both costs and risks. The authors in [16] model the bidding
interactions between a demand response aggregator (DRA)
and generators as a Stackelberg game [17] for a DA market
wherein the game is one of complete information.
In this paper, we propose a model and a fast converging
and decentralized joint demand shaping and altering algorithm
for managing PEVs’ electricity assignments (charging and
discharging) in order to minimize the electricity procurement
costs of a retailer’s bidding to two-settlement electricity mar-
kets, i.e., DA and RT markets. We adopt PJM Interconnection
[4] pricing for 2014 to evaluate our algorithms’ results.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we explain the underlying model of the
power system in this paper which entails the energy markets,
the electricity retailers or the aggregators, and the users. We
articulate different parts of this model in the sequel.
Fig. 2 represents our assumed model of a smart electricity
system where multiple users share one electricity retailer or an
aggregator. We presume that the users’ overall load consists
of two distinct types of load; typical household load which
normally needs on-demand power supply, e.g. air conditioning,
lighting, cooking and refrigerator, and PEV as a flexible
load. In this model, the dotted lines show the underlying
communication system while the solid lines represent the
power cabling infrastructure.
Energy Market 
Energy 
Retailer 1
Energy 
Retailer M
Information
User 1 User NUser 2
Fig. 2: Basic model of a smart electricity system comprised of multiple users
sharing one electricity retailer or an aggregator.
We assume that an electricity retailer bids to the energy
market, e.g., on a DA basis. Then, based on its energy needs
and the market state, it buys energy from the market at
MCPs. We assume that the retailer is willing to handle its
customers’ PEVs’ electricity assignments such that the shape
of its aggregated power demand profile matches the electricity
profile resulted from the successful bids in a DA market.
This enables the retailer to minimize its demand from the
RT market for balancing the load in the following day and
accordingly reduce the overall electricity procurement cost.
This cost reduction makes the energy retailer afford to offer
more attractive deals to the customers in the form of pricing,
rewarding, promotions, etc [8].
However, since, in practice, it is not guaranteed that the
shaped aggregated profile matches the retailer’s purchased
DA profile, the retailer often needs to reciprocate the load
imbalances in the following day by referring to RT market.
On the other hand, we should notice that residential DR
is desired to be carried out such that users’ privacy is not
violated. Therefore, DR can attract more participation from
the users if it is implemented in each user’s house in a
decentralized fashion according to this model.
III. ANALYSIS
In this section, we first formulate the electricity procurement
cost for the retailer and then provide our proposed joint
demand profile shaping and altering algorithm.
In our analysis, without loss of generality, we assume a
daily scheduling horizon and a time granularity of one hour
for electricity markets. Let (ld,pd) represents the pair of load
ld and price pd vectors which has been cleared in the DA
market. i.e.,
ld , [l1, l2 . . . , lH ]T , (1)
pd , [p1, p2 . . . , pH ]T , (2)
for which, the units of l and p are MWh and $/MWh,
respectively. Similarly, assume that (lr,pr) represents the pair
of load lr and price pr vectors which are the load imbalance
and RT price vectors in the following day. The values of
the elements of these vectors will be only known to the
retailer at each time slot of the next day. Then, the overall
electricity procurement cost for the next day can be formulated
as follows:
C(H) =< ld,pd > + < lr,pr >, (3)
in the above, < x, y > shows the inner product between
vectors x and y and C is the overall energy procurement cost
over the scheduling horizon H = 24.
First, given the purchased profile from the DA market
by the retailer, i.e., ld, the users individually contribute to
follow this demand profile by solving the following sequential
optimization problem (see Algorithm 1):
P1: minimize
lPEV,n
< lPEV,n, lA,n + l−n − ld >, (4)
βn∑
t=αn
ltPEV,n = EPEV,n, (5)
|ltPEV,n| ≤ pmax, ∀t ∈ TPPEV,n, (6)
ltPEV,n = 0,∀t /∈ TPPEV,n, (7)
SOCt=αPEV,n +
t∑
k=α+1
l′kPEV,n ≥ 0.2× CPEV,n,∀t ∈ TPPEV,n. (8)
Here, lPEV,n and lA,n show the energy assignment vector for
user n’s PEV and the aggregated load from its household
appliances, respectively. EPEV,n is the nth user’s required
energy to be allocated to its PEV which is associated with
the total required charging time TPEV,n as follows:
EPEV,n = a× TPEV,n, (9)
where a is the charging power rate. Likewise, αn and βn
represent the arrival time and departure time of the PEV.
Furthermore, |ltPEV,n| ≤ pmax limits the maximum power
that can be delivered to/from the PEV and TPPEV,n represents
the permissible charging time set or simply the set of time
slots during the PEV’s connection time to the power grid.
Additionally, l−n is the aggregated power profile from other
N − 1 users described as follows:
l−n =
∑
i∈N
i 6=n
(lPEV,i + lA,i). (10)
In (8), CPEV,n is the total storage capacity of the user n’s PEV
and we assumed that in case of employing V2G in the system,
PEV’s SOC should not fall below 20% of that total capacity in
order to make sure that the adverse impacts on PEV’s battery
due to complete depletion would not take place.
Second, knowing the fact that (lr,pr) are unknown to the
retailer a priori, at each time slot t0 of the next day after
getting this information, the retailer may decide to reshape the
previous shaped demand profile to minimize its RT electricity
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Fig. 3: Reshaping the demand profile upon a contingency.
C o
n s
u m
p t i
o n
 
( k W
)  
P o
w
e r
 
C o
n s
u m
p t i
o n
 
( k W
)  
Time of day (Hour)
Shaping the demand profile P1
Altering the demand profile P2
Fig. 4: Reshaping the demand profile upon a contingency.
purchase to balance the load and even sell back some of its
pre-purchased electricity from DA market if the price rises
significantly due to the state of the RT market or contingencies
that may increase the price unexpectedly at specific time slots
of the day.
As the chance of staying the price that much during the
next few hours of the day is low [5]. Reshaping the load
profile by lowering the electricity consumption at that time
slot and purchasing electricity at the next time slots will
yield to a lower electricity procurement cost. This is also
true for purchasing electricity at those time slots that price,
unexpectedly, falls down significantly. The retailer may buy
extra electricity at those specific time slots (based on its overall
storage capacity coming from connected PEVs) and reshape
the demand for the next hours, c.f., Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.
We should note that the retailer is assumed to be allowed to
use the existing flexibility (from each PEV) and the diversity
(coming from all the users). In other words, in our case the
electricity consumption behaviours of the users (their PEV
usage patterns) are not to be changed.
Then, the following linear multi objective programming
(MOP) allows demand altering along with pursuing the shape
of the pre-purchased electricity from DA market (see Algo-
rithm 1):
P2: min
l′PEV,n
(λ < l′PEV,n, lA,n + l
′
−n − l∗N > (11)
+(1− λ)(l′t0−n + lt0A,n + l′t0PEV,n)), (12)
[l
′1
PEV,n, · · · , l
′t0−1
PEV,n] = [l
1
PEV,n, · · · , lt0−1PEV,n], (13)
βn∑
t=t0
l′tPEV,n = EPEV,n −
t0−1∑
t=αn
ltPEV,n, (14)
|l′tPEV,n| ≤ pmax, ∀t ∈ TPPEV,n, (15)
l′tPEV,n = 0, ∀t /∈ TPPEV,n, (16)
SOCt=t0−1PEV,n +
t∑
k=t0
l′kPEV,n ≥ 0.2× CPEV,n,∀t ∈ TPPEV,n,
(17)
where λ and (1−λ) are the weights of the objective functions.
Furthermore, t0 is the request time slot for altering the
demand. In (17), SOCt=t0−1 is the SOC of the user n’s PEV
at time slot t0 and, similar to P1, we assumed that in case of
employing V2G in the system, the SOC should not fall below
20% of the total PEV’s storage capacity.
The convergence criterion in Algorithm 1 can be simply
assumed as a desired number of iterations of updating all
users’ demand profiles or it can be determined to be derived
from measuring mean square error (MSE) between two sub-
sequent iterations upon achieving aggregated demand profiles.
As we have discussed in [8], a convergence is guaranteed to
be obtained. Furthermore, users’ contribution can be modelled
as a cooperative game with complete information wherein a
Nash equilibrium exists [8].
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the DR
techniques described in the previous section, through extensive
computer simulations. In our simulations, the number of users,
N, is 1,000 and the optimization horizon is considered to be a
day, i.e., 24 hours for a DA programming scenario and a time
granularity of one hour for each time slot.
For the PEVs usage patterns, our data and distributions are
based on 2009 NHTS data [18]. We considered new standard
outlets, NEMA 5-15, providing 1.8 kW power. Furthermore,
SOC for each PEV at the arrival time is as follows in
percentage points:
SOCt=αPEV,n = 100× (1−
EPEV,n
24
). (18)
In other words, we assumed that PEVs are needed to be fully
charged by their respective next departure time. Additionally,
we considered 24 kWh energy storage capacity for PEVs
according to Nissan Leaf model [19]. We adopted the PJM
interconnection electricity market pricing data for both DA
and RT markets in 2014 [4].
Fig. 5 shows the DA and RT prices for March 9 2014 as an
example. We chose this day since it had the highest peak in
RT prices throughout the year in PJM and can be assumed as
what we referred to as a black swan event in the market. As
it can be observed, the RT price has a substantial peak at 9
A.M. around which the price is still unexpectedly high for 5
hours. The retailer can choose to proceed for demand altering
program P2 upon receiving this pricing information.
Algorithm 1 Joint Demand Shaping & Altering
1: All N users initialize their respective load profiles over
the scheduling horizon based on their respective demands,
i.e., ln for n = 1, . . . , N .
2: All N users send their initialized load profiles to the
retailer.
3: while not reaching convergence do
4: for n = 1 to N do
5: The retailer calculates the state information l−n
according to (10) for user n.
6: The retailer sends (l−n − ld) to user n.
7: User n solves problem P1 and updates its load
profile ln.
8: User n sends back the new demand profile to the
retailer.
9: The retailer updates ln.
10: end for
11: end while
12: The retailer receives information from RT market.
13: The retailer finds t0.
14: while not reaching convergence do
15: for n = 1 to N do
16: The retailer sends demand altering signal at time
slot t0 to user n.
17: User n solves problem P2 and updates its load
profile l
′
n.
18: User n sends back the new demand profile to the
retailer.
19: The retailer updates l
′
n.
20: The retailer calculates the state information l
′
−n
according to (10) for user n.
21: end for
22: end while
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Fig. 5: DA and RT prices for March 9 2014 in PJM interconnection electricity
market (the number of days with such behaviour in 2014 is quite considerable).
The amount of success in demand altering depends on the
availability of PEVs at users’ dwellings which is dissimilar
for different hours of a day and different days of a week, see
Fig. 6.
Next, we examine the DR scheme introduced in Algorithm
1. Fig. 7 shows the electricity demand profile from only typical
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Fig. 6: The number of PEVs available at users’ dwellings for different hours
of a day according to NHTS [18].
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Fig. 7: Electricity demand profile from (a) only normal household appliances,
i.e., without PEVs and (b) the overall electricity demand profile when users
use PEVs with different usage patterns based on NHTS data.
household appliances, i.e., without PEVs and the overall
electricity demand profile when users use PEVs with different
usage patterns based on NHTS data.
We assume that Fig. 8 shows the electricity profile pur-
chased by the retailer from the DA market. In other words,
it shows the bids that could be cleared in the market. The
results of Algorithm 1 for shaping the demand profile and
joint shaping and altering the demand is depicted in Fig. 9.
For this, we assumed λ = 0.5 in 12. It can be observed that
at 9 A.M. when the highest RT price occurs, demand altering
can reduces the aggregated demand from 948.2 kWh to 599.3
kWh, i.e., we can obtain almost %37 reduction in the overall
demand.
In our simulations, convergence has been attained only after
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Fig. 8: The assumed electricity profile purchased by the retailer from the DA
market by the bids that could be cleared.
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Fig. 9: Load profiles after using Algorithm 1 for (a) shaping and then (b)
altering the demand at 9 A.M.
one single iteration of updating all users’ electricity demand
profiles for both P1 and P2 in Algorithm 1.
It should be emphasized that this could be achieved since
at that hour of the day we had almost 330 V2G enabled
PEVs available at users’ dwellings. Different results would
be obtained for the other hours of that day. Especially, it is
obvious that the amount of cost savings would be dissimilar
for a weekday and a weekend day, see Fig. 6.
In Table I, we compare the overall energy procurement costs
for the retailer for two cases: case 1) when there is no PEV in
TABLE I: OVERALL ENERGY PROCUREMENT COSTS FOR THE RETAILER
Case Overall ideal cost ($) Overall real cost ($) Overall cost after P1 ($) Overall cost after P2 ($)
1 $674.4 $2808.9 N/A N/A
2 $920.4 $5865.1 $4775.6 $4308.9
the system and case 2) when all the users possess PEVs with
their respective usage patterns.
It can be noticed that in case 1, if the retailer could be
absolutely successful in bidding to the DA market, i.e., there
would not be any need to purchase electricity from the RT
market, the overall cost is so much lower for our assumed
pricing in Fig. 5. In a more realistic case, when the retailer’s
bidding to the DA market is assumed to be according Fig. 8,
and the retailer is required to balance the load, the overall cost
is much higher.
In this case, we also assumed that the retailer can sell back
its extra load purchased earlier from the DA market to the
RT market at the same price offered by the RT market. This
happens a few times such as at 4 P.M. Obviously, demand
shaping and demand altering in this case is not applicable
(N/A) as there is no PEV in the system.
For the second case, when users possess PEVs, for the ideal
bidding the overall cost increases by almost %37 to supply
electricity to the PEVs whereas for the realistic bidding it
becomes more than double.
When demand shaping P1 is employed, this overall cost
reduces by around %18. Furthermore, when joint demand
shaping and altering in Algorithm 1 is used, it decreases
further by almost %10.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a fast converging and decentral-
ized joint demand shaping and altering algorithm for managing
V2G enabled PEVs’ electricity assignments (charging and
discharging) to reduce the overall electricity procurement cost
for an electricity retailer. Our proposed algorithm uses demand
shaping and demand altering for the DA and the RT markets,
respectively. In particular, when the power system has high
penetration of intermittent energy resources, demand altering
is crucial due to likely contingencies and hence more RT
price fluctuations. In our simulations’ results, we considered
a specific day in 2014 which had high unexpected RT prices
for some hours in PJM interconnection electricity market. We
showed that significant overall cost savings (up to %28) for a
retailer bidding to this electricity market can be achieved by
using our proposed algorithm. This allows the retailer to offer
better deals to the customers and expand its market capacity.
Therefore, customers can enjoy lower electricity bills as well.
The work presented in this paper can be extended in various
ways. First, the overall amount of flexibility offered by PEVs
for demand altering throughout different hours of a day can
be obtained. Second, the retailer can determine a threshold
based on which it proceeds for demand altering. This can
be done via stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) and data
mining. Third, recently, PEVs’ battery storage capacity has
been expanded up to 60-85 kWh, e.g., for Tesla model S
and model X [20], which can provide much more elasticity
for demand shaping and demand altering and hence reduce
the electricity costs further. Finally, demand altering for the
RT market does not necessarily need to take place at only
one specific hour of the day as the high unexpected price
can remain large for a few hours. We are addressing all these
points together with some more detailed analyses in the follow
up journal paper of this work.
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